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Several methods for avoiding the receipt of boot by either party to the
exchange have been suggested, including inducing one partnership to borrow
sufficient funds for legitimate business reasons to balance the liabilities or
having one partnership pay off enough partnership liabilities to balance
the exchanged liabilities.9 0 While these suggestions appear theoretically
sound, implementing them in practice may prove to be another matter.
CONCLUSION

There are two fertile grounds for disallowing the tax free exchange of
partnership interests. Partnership interests may be deemed to constitute nonqualified property under section 1031, or the partnership interests in question may not meet the like kind requirement. Both of these alternatives
could turn on whether an aggregate or an entity approach is involved. As discussed previously, the tax law treatment of partnerships has not been bound
by either classification - whichever approach will achieve the desired result
is applied.
Given the numerous possibilities of the transaction being taxed, exchanges
of partnership interests should not be relied on in a planning context. If
an exchange represents the client's wishes despite the tax consequences, there
is sufficient authority to attempt a return of the exchange as a nonrecognition
event. The only potential cost is the interest on the deficiency.
LARRY GRACG

INCOME TAX PLANNING FOR THE CORPORATE

EXECUTIVE: A CASE AGAINST DEFERRAL
INTRODUCTION

Highly compensated corporate executives commonly suffer the burden
of "bunched" income- very high earnings for a relatively short period of
years and a marked decline in earnings upon retirement. Because their
high earning years are comparatively short, they face a concentration in
that period of exceptionally high federal income taxes. This commentary
examines the tax and nontax considerations relevant to the development of
a suitable income tax savings plan for such an executive. The focus is on
the form in which a salary or bonus will be received and the timing of its
receipt.' The problem is viewed only from the executive's perspective. It is
assumed that the employer is willing to pay all compensation in cash
when earned but would also agree to any form of deferred payment which
90.

Blankenship, supra note 83, at 281.

1. It is assumed throughout this commentary that the executive, like nearly
employees, uses the cash method of accounting. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §446(c)(1).
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is economically equivalent to an immediate cash payment. Ultimately, the
commentary concludes that, contrary to popular belief, deferred arrangements will often be disadvantageous to the executive because of changes
in the tax laws made by the Tax Reform Act of 1969.2
IMMEDIXATE CASH PAYMENT

The simplest compensation method for the executive is to receive the
salary or bonus payment in cash when earned. In order to determine if a

deferral plan is desirable, it is first necessary to determine the tax consequences
of an immediate cash payment.
Section 1348(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter "Code"),
enacted as a part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, limits the maximum rate
of tax on "personal service income" to 50 percent.2 "Personal service income"
includes any income characterized as "earned income" by section 911(b).Y
The latter provision defines earned income to include "wages, salaries, or
professional fees, and other amounts received as compensation for personal
services actually rendered." 5 Therefore, immediate salary or bonus payments
to an executive constitute personal service income and will be taxed at a
maximum rate of 50 percent. In lieu of using the maximum tax, an executive
may be able to reduce his income taxes on an immediate cash payment by
taking advantage of the income averaging provisions of the Code. 6
The after-tax salary or bonus amount can then be invested by the
executive. Investment income, however, is not personal service income under
section 1348(b) and will be taxed at rates as high as 70 percent.7 In
comparing a deferral plan to an immediate cash payment, the after-tax investment income available to the executive if he takes an immediate cash
payment should be projected and compounded until the last year in which
a proposed deferred payment would be received. For example, assume that a
proposed plan provides that the 1977 salary or bonus will be deferred and
paid in ten annual installments commencing in 1985. The after-tax investment income should then be projected and compounded from 1977 through
1994. The sum of the after-tax salary or bonus amount and the total after-tax
investment income is the figure against which any proposed deferred salary
or bonus plan must be measured.
2. Qualified pension and profit-sharing plans will not be considered because they
generally must cover a number of employees and so cannot be tailored to meet the
needs of a particular executive. See Id. §401(a).
3. Id. §1348(a).

4. Id. §1348(b)(1)(A).
5. Id. §911(b).
6. Id. §§1301-1305. It should be noted that §1348 and the income averaging provisions
are mutually exclusive. Id. §§1304(b)(5) and 1348(a). It should also be noted that §1348
does not apply to a married executive unless he files a joint return with his spouse. See
Id. §1348(c). Finally, it should be pointed out that the amount of "personal service
income" eligible for the 50 per cent maximum tax rate is reduced by the sum of the
executive's items of tax preference for the taxable year under §57. See Id. §1348(b)(2)(B).
7. Id. §1.
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VARIOUS FORMS OF NONQUALIFIED
DEFERRED SALARY OR BONUS PLANS

Deferral of payment can reduce tax only if the time of taxation is deferred
and then only if the executive's maximum tax rate declines. The goal is
to defer both the receipt and the taxation of income to years in which
the executive's maximum tax rate is lower than the maximum rate for the
year in which the income was earned.
For purposes of this discussion, nonqualified deferred salary or bonus
plans are divided into two types, secured and unsecured. An unsecured plan
is one which is unfunded or internally funded so that the executive relies
solely on the general credit of his employer. A secured plan, on the other
hand, provides the executive with a separate fund, insulated from claims of
general creditors of the employer, from which future payments will be made.
These types of plans will now be examined in turn.
TAXATION OF UNSECURED PLANS

In

an unfunded deferred salary or bonus plan, the employer merely

promises to make future payments for work currently performed. There is
no specific fund out of which the future payments are to be made. The
executive, after fulfillment of his obligations under the employment contract, occupies the status of a general creditor. Similarly, in an "internally

funded" deferred salary or bonus plan, the employer sets aside a reserve
or purchases insurance or annuity contracts which remain subject to the
employer's ownership or control. The amounts set aside are actually funds
of the employer shifted from one book account to another. The employer
remains the owner of the fund, which is subject to claims of the employer's
creditors. It is the promise of the employer- not the fund- on which the
executive relies for future payment. As in an unfunded arrangement, the
executive occupies the status of a general creditor. For this reason, unfunded
and internally funded plans are treated identically for income tax purposes.8
To facilitate discussion, both unfunded and internally funded non qualified
deferred salary or bonus arrangements are referred to herein as unsecured
plans.
Applicability of Section 83 to UnsecuredPlans
Section 83 of the Code, enacted as a part of the Tax Reform Act of
1969, governs the taxation of property transferred in connection with the
performance of services. 9 When it applies, section 83 requires inclusion of

income in the year in which the executive's rights in transferred property
are transferable or cease to be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. 10 The
proposed regulations provide that unsecured promises to pay deferred com8.

See Vernava, Taxation of Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, 10 CAL. WEST. L.

REV. 239, 249 (1974).
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §83.

10.

Id. §83(a).
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pensation do not constitute property for section 83 purposes."1 As a result,
section 83 is inapplicable to unsecured plans because there has been no
transfer of section 83 property.
Applicability of the ConstructiveReceipt
and Economic-Benefit Doctrinesto Unsecured Plans
Apart from section 83, the amount of a deferred salary or bonus payment
will be included in income for the taxable year in which the executive
actually or constructively receives cash or an economic benefit equivalent to
cash. 2 The regulations provide that income is constructively received by
a taxpayer "in the taxable year during which it is credited to his account,
set apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he may draw upon
it at any time, or so that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable
year if notice of intention to withdraw had been given."1 8 The regulations,
however, also provide that "income is not constructively received if the
taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or
restrictions."14 The regulations suggest that the constructive receipt doctrine
would not apply to most unsecured plans because the executive would not
have a legal right to require payment until each payment fell due, which
makes the receipt of the deferred payments subject to a substantial limitation
or restriction.15 The Service has ruled that the constructive receipt doctrine
does not apply to an unsecured plan. 16 The Service has also impliedly ruled
11.
12.

PRoPosED TREAS. REG., §1.83-3(e), 36 Fed. Reg. 10787 (1971).
TREAS. RG. §§1A51-1(a) and 1.61-2(d)(1).

13. Id. §1.451-2(a).
14. Id.
15. The following example at TREAs. REG. §1.451-2(a) supports this conclusion: "[I]f
a corporation credits its employees with bonus stock, but the stock is not available to
such employees until some future date, the mere crediting on the books of the corporation
does not constitute receipt." However, a factor which must be considered in determining
whether the constructive receipt doctrine applies is the time when the agreement or
election to defer was made. In general, the agreement or election to defer must be
made before the compensation is earned. Apparently, the Service has taken the position
that elections as to the time of payment, exercisable after the compensation is earned,
will result in the executive's being in constructive receipt at the earliest time he could
elect to receive the income, unless his right to receive the future payments is forfeitable
until he is paid. Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 CuM. BULL. 698. This is significant since it reduces
flexibility. An executive cannot extend the deferral period after he finds he has greater
income at the time scheduled for payment than was originally anticipated.
16. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 Cuma. BULL. 174 (Example 1), which deals with an
unsecured deferred compensation plan. Under the contract in that example, the taxpayer
was entitled to receive a stated annual salary and was also entitled to additional deferred
compensation for services currently performed. The employer's promise to make these
future payments was unsecured. The Service held that "a mere promise to pay, not
represented by notes or secured in any way, is not regarded as a receipt of income within
the intendment of the cash receipts and disbursements method." In so holding, the Service
has taken the position that the doctrine of constructive receipt has no application to
an unsecured plan. It should be noted that neither the Service nor the courts will look
behind the facts and circumstances of individual deferred compensation contracts and
speculate whether fhe executive has turned his back on income. Id. at 178; J.D. Amend, 13

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss1/7

4

Russo: Income Tax Planning for the Corporate Executive: A Case Against D
[Vol. xxx
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
that the economic-benefit doctrine has no application to unsecured plans.1
Therefore, taxation of unsecured plans will be deferred until payments are
actually received.
TAXATION OF SECURED PLANS

It has been shown that an unsecured deferred salary or bonus plan may
defer both the receipt and taxation of income. Optimum tax deferral, however, is not without cost to the executive. If the employer later becomes
insolvent, the executive may lose all or part of the deferred amount because
he is only in the position of a general creditor of the employer. To protect
himself against the risk of employer insolvency, the executive may enter into
a secured plan. For the purposes of this discussion, a secured plan is one that
provides a fund, apart from the general assets of the employer, which can be
drawn upon in satisfaction of the employer's promise to make future payments. This commentary examines the following forms of secured plans:
(1) the transfer of stock or securities either directly to the executive or to a
special account set up on the employer's books with the executive receiving a security interest in the property; (2) the guarantee of an employer's
otherwise unsecured promise by a financially sound shareholder; and (3) the
transfer of the bonus or salary to a nonexempt trust for the executive's
benefit.
Section 83 directs the taxation of property transferred in connection with
T.C. 178 (1949), acquiesced in, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 1. Therefore, if by the terms of the
contract the executive has a legal right to payments only as they become due, he is not in
constructive receipt of these payments and will not be taxed until they are actually
received.
17. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 174 (Example 1). Without specifically
mentioning the economic-benefit doctrine, the Service ruled that the taxpayer's right to
receive the future compensation would not be currently taxable. This result is reached
only if the economic-benefit doctrine is inapplicable. Thus, the implied holding of the
ruling is that the economic- benefit doctrine does not apply to an unsecured deferred
compensation plan. This reasoning is buttressed by the fact that in Example 4 of Rev.
Rul. 60-31 the Service recognized that the economic-benefit doctrine applies to a secured
deferred compensation plan. Subsequent revenue rulings and a revenue procedure have
also indicated this result. See Rev. Rul. 69-649, 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 106. See also Rev. Rul.
67-449, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 173; Rev. Rul. 69-650, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 106; and Rev. Proc. 7119, 1971-1 CuM. BULL. 698. The same result has also been reached on the basis that
the employer's promise to pay in the future is not taken as payment for the obligation
but merely as evidence of the debt. See Schlemmer v. U.S., 94 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1938);
Jay A. Williams, 28 T.C. 1000 (1957). However, compare this result with Cowden v.
Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. P9382 (5th Cir. 1961), and Rev. Rul. 68-606,
1968-2 CuM. BULL. 42 which essentially hold that the economic-benefit doctrine applies
to unsecured arrangements unless the right to future payments is not readily marketable.
Apparently, the theory is that an unsecured promise constitutes the receipt of property.
It should be noted, however, that both Cowden and Rev. Rul. 68-606 were decided before
PROPOSED TREAs. REG. §1.83-5(e) was issued. The proposed regulation provides that an
unsecured promise does not constitute property for purposes of §83. Nonetheless, to
insure that the economic-benefit doctrine does not apply to an unsecured plan, the
executive's right to receive deferred payments should be made nonassignable. See Drysdale
v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 413, 418 (6th Cir. 1960).
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the performance of services. This provision applies to each of the secured
arrangements listed above.'8 To reiterate, when section 83 applies, taxation
is generally deferred, but only so long as the executive's rights remain
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture and are nontransferable. 19
Applicability of Section 83 to Secured Plans
Section 83 becomes applicable upon the transfer of property in connection
with the performance of services. A transfer2 0 by an employer to an executive
dearly is made "in connection with the performance of [the executive's]
services" 2' when a secured deferred salary or bonus plan is initiated. The
question is whether "property" has been transferred. The proposed regulations under section 83 provide that "the term 'property' includes both realty
and personalty other than money and other than an unfunded and unsecured
promise to pay deferred compensation." 22
If stock or securities are directly transferred to the executive, subject to
forfeiture upon the occurrance of certain events, the transfer constitutes a
18. It is submitted that §83 is applicable to all forms of secured deferred salary or
bonus arrangements. But see the discussion of the definition of the term "transfer" for
purposes of §83, at note 20 infra.
19. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §83(a).
20. The proposed regulations provide that "[n]o transfer of property occurs upon

a person's acquisition of an interest in property for the sole purpose of securing the
payment of deferred compensation." PROPOSED TREAS. 1RG. §1.83-3(a)(1), 36 Fed. Reg.
10787

(1971). The examples in the proposed regulations interpreting this language are

vague but seem to indicate that neither the transfer of the property which secures the
payment of deferred compensation nor the transfer of the promise to make the deferred
payments are transfers for purposes of §83. Id. §1.83-3(a)(2). Thus, it can be argued that
§83 is inapplicable to secured deferred compensation plans because there is no §83
"transfer." However, the proposed regulations define the term "property" for purposes
of §83 to include a secured promise to pay deferred compensation. Id. §1.83-3(e). The
latter provision in the proposed regulations is rendered meaningless unless a secured
promise to pay deferred compensation can be the subject of a §83 transfer. Therefore, it
would seem that the proposed regulations which define the term transfer merely suggest
that the transfer of property to secure a promise to pay deferred compensation is not
a transfer for purposes of §83. But the transfer of a promise to pay deferred compensation
secured by such property is a §83 transfer. This interpretation of the regulations makes
sense, especially when compared to the taxation of transfers to nonexempt trusts. Section
402(b) states that transfers to nonexempt trusts shall be taxed in accordance with §83.
INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, §402(b). Section 1.83-3(a)(1) of the proposed regulations and
the legislative history accompanying the enactment of §83 indicate that transfers to nonexempt trusts for the sole purpose of securing the payment of deferred compensation
are transfers for §83 purposes. See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 120 (1969),
1969-3 Cums. BuLL. 423, 500. It would seem, therefore, that §83 should apply to a transfer
of a secured promise to pay deferred compensation regardless of whether the security for
the promise is housed in a nonexempt trust. The regulations pertaining to §83 "transfers"
are only in proposed form, and hopefully the final regulations will remove this inconsistency.
If a transfer of a secured promise to pay deferred compensation is determined not to
be a "transfer" for purposes of §83, then taxation will be determined under the economicbenefit doctrine. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 174 (Example 4).
21. PROPOSED TREAs. REG. §I.83-3(), 36 Fed. Reg. 10787
22. Id. §1.83-3(e).
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transfer of section 83 property because stock and securities are personalty.
The result would seem to be the same if the stock or securities were retained
by the employer and the executive received a security interest in them,
because the proposed regulations suggest that all forms of personal property,
other than an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay deferred compensation, constitute section 83 property. 23 Thus, when the executive receives a
security interest in stock or securities, it

is the secured promise - not the

underlying stock or securities - that constitutes section 83 property.
It is likely that the same result would be reached if the employer's promise
to make future payments was guaranteed by a financially sound stockholder.
The question is whether this guaranteed agreement is a secured promise to
pay deferred compensation. It would seem that a guarantee constitutes
security for the promise, and, according to the proposed regulations, a secured
promise constitutes property for purposes of section 83.24
Similarly, section 402(b) of the Code provides that contributions to a
nonexempt trust are included in the executive's gross income in accordance
with section 83.25 Therefore, section 83 would also control the taxation of

the transfer of the bonus or salary to a nonexempt trust for the executive's
benefit.
Effect of Section 83 on Secured Plans
When it applies section 83 requires inclusion in the executive's income
in the year in which his rights to the transferred property are transferable or

cease to be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. 26 The executive's
rights are nontransferable if no transferee can take title to the property
free of a substantial risk of forfeiture.2 7 If stock is transferred to an executive
subject to the executive's agreement not to transfer, the stock is transferable
28
in the section 83 sense unless the restriction is noted on the stock certificate.

23. Id. But see the discussion of the definition of "transfer" for purposes of §83 at
note 20 supra.
24. Id.
25. A nonexempt trust is a trust that does not meet the requirements of §401(a).
Trust earnings are taxed differently than earnings produced by the executive's personal
savings from a cash bonus or salary. The trust would be a separate taxable entity and
would be taxed on any income it accumulated under Subchapter J of the Code. The
trust would probably be in a lower tax bracket than the executive. However, the trust
income would also be taxed to the executive. This is so because the amount subject
to the rules of §83 is limited to the amount of the employer's contribution to the
trust. PROPOSED TREAS. REG. §1.402(b) - l(b)(3) 37 Fed. Reg. 9278 (1972). Trust distributions would be taxed under the rules of §72. Section 72(f) provides that if periodic distributions were made, the executive would compute an exclusion ratio using the amount
taxable to him under §83 as his investment in the contract. The effect would be to
tax trust earnings to the executive when received. There would be an advantage in
that the tax paid by the executive would be delayed, probably to years when his marginal
rate bracket was lower. There is, however, an offsetting disadvantage in that trust
earnings would be taxed twice-once to the trust and once to the executive.
26. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §83(a).
27. PROPOSED TREA S. REc. §1.83-3(d), 36 Fed. Reg. 10787 (1971).
28. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 7
CORPORATE EXECUTIVE

If the property transferred is a secured promise, contained in an agreement
that restricts the executive in a meaningful way, the property is probably
nontransferable, even if the agreement does not preclude transfers, because
at common law one cannot acquire a contract right free of restrictions stated in
the agreement. Thus, the executive's rights in the transferred property can
easily be made nontransferable.
A greater problem, however, is that of subjecting the executive's rights
to a substantial risk of forfeiture for the entire deferral period. Section
83(c) (1) provides that the executive's right to future payment is subject to
a substantial risk of forfeiture only if that right is conditioned upon the
performance of substantial services by the executive. 2 The proposed regulations state that a substantial risk of forfeiture exists:
"if such person's rights to full enjoyment of such property are
conditioned upon the future performance, or the refraining from the
performance, of substantial services by any individual. Whether such
services are substantial depends upon the particular facts and circumstances. The regularity of the performance of services and the
time spent in performing such services tend to indicate whether
services are substantial .... Thus, for example, a requirement that an
employee must return property transferred to him in connection with
his performance of services for his employer if he does not complete
an additional period of substantial services would cause such property
to be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. . . . An enforceable
requirement that the property be returned to the employer if the
employee accepts a job with a competing firm will not ordinarily be
considered to result in a substantial risk of forfeiture unless the
particular facts and circumstances indicate to the contrary. Factors
which may be taken into account in determining whether a covenant
not to compete constitutes a substantial risk of forfeiture are the age
of the employee, the availability of alternative employment opportunities, the likelihood of the employee's obtaining such other employment,
the degree of skill possessed by the employee, the employee's health,
and the practice (if any) of the employer to enforce such covenants.
Similarly, rights in property transferred to a retiring employee subject
to the sole requirement that it be returned unless he renders consulting
services upon the request of his former employer would not be considered subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture unless he is in fact
expected to perform substantial services .. .
Under this provision, it is probable that a years-of-service, 31 noncompetition 2 or consulting 3 clause would initially cause the executive's rights in
29. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §83(c)(1). It is not dear that §83(c)(1) is the exclusive
definition of "substantial risk of forfeiture." The legislative history of §83 suggests it is
not an exclusive definition. See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 120 (1969), 1969-3
Cum. BuLL. 423, 500. It probably is true, however, that if future services are the

condition relied on as the risk of forfeiture, the services must be substantial.
30. PEoPosED TREAS. REG. §1.83-3(c)(1), 36 Fed. Reg. '10787 (1971). (Emphasis added).
31. A years-of-service clause is one which commits the executive to perform services
for a defined period.
32. A noncompetition clause is one which requires the executive to devote his skills

in a manner which would not constitute competition with the employer.
33. A consulting clause is one which requires the executive to perform consulting
services for a specified period.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss1/7
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the transferred property to be considered subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. No type of restrictive clause or combination thereof, however, would
result in subjecting the executive's rights to a substantial risk of forfeiture
for the entire deferral period. A series of examples will illustrate the problem
and reinforce this conclusion.
Assume that the executive has deferred his 1977 salary of $150,000 by
means of one of the secured arrangements discussed above. The contract
provides that deferred amounts are to be paid in ten annual installments
commencing in 1985 and further provides that the right to receive these
deferred payments is nonassignable and is conditioned upon the executive's
working for the employer until 1980. Now, assume that the executive fulfills
the terms of the agreement by providing his services to the employer until
1980. During the period 1977-1980, the executive's right to receive the
deferred payments is nontransferable and subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture. Consequently, the income tax would be effectively deferred. But,
after the executive fulfills the service obligation by working through 1980,
although his right to receive the future payments remains nontransferable,
this right is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. At that
point, the executive would be subject to immediate taxation under section
83.
Moreover, if the executive becomes disabled before 1980, the deferred
amounts would be completely forfeited because these future payments were
to be made only if the executive provided substantial services to the
employer until 1980. On the other hand, if the executive's right was
conditioned on his providing services until 1980, or for as long as he
was able to perform the services, the executive would be subject to tax
when it is determined that he is unable to continue to perform services.
This result is reached because the executive's right to receive the future payments would no longer be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. Consequently, section 83 would. cause him to be taxed in the year of disability.
The same result would obtain if a noncompetition clause were used
instead of a years-of-service clause. The proposed regulations suggest that
a noncompetition clause constitutes a substantial risk of forfeiture only if
there is substantial possibility that the executive would compete in the
absence of the restraint and then only if there is a meaningful possibility
that the executive would be in a better position if he forfeited his rights
34

under the contract.

Assume, for example, that the executive's right to receive future payments is conditioned on his refraining from competition with his employer.
The proposed regulations provide that the health of the executive is one
of the factors taken into consideration in determining whether a noncompetition clause creates a substantial risk of forfeiture. 35 If the executive

34.
35.

PROPOSED TREAs. REG. §1.83-3(c)(1),

36 Fed. Reg. 10787

(1971).

Id.
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is permanently disabled, there is no longer a substantial possibility that
he would compete in the absence of the noncompetition clause. The executive's noncompetition at that point would result from the disability and not
from the covenant not to compete. His right to the future payments would
no longer be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, and section 83 would
require income inclusion at that time.
Furthermore, if the executive retires before he begins to receive the
deferred payments (which is a common situation), his rights would probably
then cease to be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. At retirement,
the executive usually has no intention to work for anyone else, and there
would be no meaningful restriction on his services. Also, apart from the
executive's unwillingness to work after retirement, the proposed regulations
state that the availability of alternative employment opportunities is a
factor considered in determining whether the noncompetition clause creates
a substantial risk of forfeiture.36 Because few employers are interested in
hiring a sixty or sixty-five-year-old executive, it is likely that no alternative
employment opportunity would exist. Therefore, while the noncompetition
provision would create a risk of forfeiture, the risk would probably not be
"substantial." As a result, the income tax would be deferred only as long
as the executive was working. Upon retirement, the executive would be
83.
subject to taxation under section
Similarly, assume that the executive's right to receive future payments
is subject not only to years-of-service and noncompetition clauses but is
also subject to a consulting clause. Assume further that the executive has
satisfied the years-of-service requirement and that the noncompetition clause
does not create a substantial risk of forfeiture. If the consulting restriction
does not cause the executive's right to future payment to be subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture, the executive would be immediately taxed
under section 83. The proposed regulations state that a consulting restriction
will not be considered a substantial risk of forfeiture unless the executive
is expected to perform substantial services.3 7 The proposed regulations also
state that whether services are substantial depends upon the regularity of
the performance and the time spent in performing such services.38 When an
executive retires he may be expected to perform consulting services, however,
it is doubtful that he would be expected to perform substantial consulting
services. Moreover, if the executive becomes permanently disabled, he
probably would not be expected to consult in the future. Once it is determined
that the executive is not expected to perform substantial consulting services,
the executive would be taxed under section 83.
In addition to the foregoing considerations, the proposed regulations
impose higher standards for meeting the substantial risk of forfeiture test
on executives who own, directly or indirectly, more than five percent of the
total combined voting power or value of all classes of stock of the employer

36. Id.

37. Id.
38. Id.
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corporation or of its parent or subsidiary corporation. s9 If the executive falls
into this class of employees, greater difficulty will be encountered in subjecting
his right to receive future payments to a substantial risk of forfeiture for
the entire deferral period.
A final illustration may serve to dissuade executives from entering into
secured deferred salary or bonus arrangements. Assume that the employer
discontinues operation. Proponents of deferral would argue that the executive is safe because his contract is secured and there is a separate fund apart
from the employer's general assets from which the deferred payments can
be made. However, even assuming that the contract has years-of-service,
consulting and noncompetition clauses, if the employer ceases to exist it
cannot demand additional service from the executive. Also, a court could
not enforce a covenant not to compete in its favor.4 0 The executive's right to
future payment thus ceases to be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture
and the executive is immediately taxed under section 83.
Amount Included Under Section 83
When section 83 applies to secured deferred salary or bonus plans, the
executive must include in gross income an amount equal to the fair market
value of the property at the time of the event which causes income inclusion.41 If that event occurs before the time of payment to the executive,
the result is "phantom income": the recognition of income without the
receipt of money with -which to pay the resulting tax. Assume that the
executive's right to the deferred payments ceases to be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture in 1980. Assume further that the 1980 value of the
right to receive the deferred payments commencing in 1985, determined
without regard to restrictions, 42 is

$100,000.

In 1980 the executive would be

taxed under section 83 on $100,000 of income even though he would not
actually begin receiving the payments until 1985. An immediate cash payment eliminates the possibility of phantom income.
INCOME TAX FACTORS RELATING TO DEFERRAL

Because the federal income tax rates are progressive, deferral of income to
later years will at times reduce the overall income tax bite. For example,
assume an executive agrees to defer a portion of his 1977 salary or bonus,

and the deferred amounts are payable in ten annual installments commencing
in 1985. If the executive is taxed on the deferred amounts only when
received and if his maximum tax rate is lower in 1985 and later years than
39. Id.
40. It should be noted that if the executive enters into a personal service contract
with the shareholders of the employer rather than with the employer corporation, the
contract would probably be enforceable.
41. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §83(a). It is assumed that in a salary or bonus plan the
executive has no investment in the property transferred, so that §83(a)(2) is inapplicable.
Also, the effect of the §83(b) election is beyond the scope of this commentary.
42. Id. §83(a)(1).
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in 1977, income taxes on the salary or bonus earned in 1977 will be reduced.
It should be noted, however, that deferral of income can have the opposite
consequence if the deferred payments are received in years in which the
executive's maximum tax rate is higher than the rate for the year in which
the income was earned. If such a result is foreseeable, a deferral plan should
43
be rejected in favor of an immediate cash payment.
NON-INCOmE TAx FACTORS RELATNG To DEFRuL
Even when deferral will result in an income tax savings to the executive,
non-income tax factors can militate against selecting such a plan. By deferring
income, the executive must forego the present use and enjoyment of the
funds. In an inflationary economy, present dollars have a greater buying
power than dollars received in later years. Because of this erosion in the
buying power of the dollar, the choice is between receiving a lesser dollar
amount now, or receiving a greater dollar amount with less purchasing power
in the future. The loss of the use of the funds can be minimized, however,
by providing in the plan for interest at a rate, subject to periodic adjustment,
that the executive would have received on the open market.
In addition, with an unsecured deferred salary or bonus plan, the executive occupies the status of a general creditor of the employer. If the employer
encounters financial difficulties, the executive may lose all or part of the
deferred amount." The recent proliferation of bankruptcy cases, involving
even very large corporations, underscores this hazard. If an unsecured plan
is being considered, the financial soundness of the employer should be of
primary importance. If the employer has a poor financial record, it would
be inadvisable to select an unsecured plan even though it is found to offer
the most advantageous income tax treatment.
Furthermore, if a deferred salary or bonus plan is secured, tax deferral
can be accomplished only if the executive restricts himself in a meaningful
way.45 Such restrictions limit the executive's professional mobility, and noncompliance with these restrictions will cause loss of the right to receive
future payments. If the executive does not wish to be so restricted or risk
the loss of the future payments, a secured deferral plan may not be suitable
for him.
Finally, the effect of deferring income on the Federal Insurance Contribu43. When attempting to predict what the executive's income will be in the future it
should be noted that most executives are participants in. their employer's pension or
profit-sharing plans. This is significant because payments from these plans when added
to the deferred salary or bonus payments may result in deferral producing little or
no tax savings and may even result in the deferred income being taxed at a rate
higher than the rate in force when the income was earned. It should also be noted
that payments from pension, profit-sharing and deferred salary or bonus.plans constitute
"personal service income" under §1348(b)(1)(A) and generally would be taxed at a rate
no higher than 50 per cent under §1348(a).
44. The executive's possible rights in a bankruptcy proceeding are beyond the. scope
of this commentary.
45.

INT.

REv.

CODE OF

1954, §83(a).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss1/7

12

Russo: Income Tax Planning for the Corporate Executive: A Case Against D
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vl.XX

tion Act (FICA) tax is another factor which must be considered in determining
whether a deferred salary or bonus plan is advisable. Sections 3101(a) (5) and
3101(b)(3) of the Code impose a combined tax of 5.85 percent on "wages," 4 1
which is defined in section 3121(a) to include "all remuneration for employment."47 The regulations specifically provide that salary and bonus payments constitute wages. 48 Furthermore, the Social Security Administration
has ruled that deferred compensation payments constitute wages for
purposes of the FICA tax.49 Section 3121(a) (1), however, excepts from the
definition of wages, remuneration in excess of $16,500 (the taxable wage
base) in any year.50 Therefore, if the executive elects an immediate cash
payment, there is no FICA tax on sums over the $16,500 taxable wage base.
But, if the executive defers all or part of his compensation, the deferred
compensation will be taxed up to the maximum wage base limit each
year in which it is received. In effect, by deferring income, the taxable wage
base is increased. Moreover, the taxable wage base and the tax rate will
increase in the future. 51 This, of course, will increase the future FICA
taxes on any deferred payments and makes an immediate cash payment
more attractive.
CONCLUSION

In summary, many if not all executives should immediately take their
salary or bonus in cash. By receiving the cash immediately, the executive
obtains the present use and enjoyment of it. The effect of inflation can be
minimized by investing the after-tax dollars. Furthermore, the executive will
pay a FICA tax only on a single taxable wage base. Deferral, on the other
hand, is replete with shortcomings. There is, of course, the initial problem
of predicting what the executive's income will be in future years, because
deferral is advantageous only if income is deferred to low tax rate years.
If an unsecured plan is used, deferring taxation until receipt is not a
problem because the executive's right to receive the deferred payments
does not have to be restricted. If the employer becomes insolvent however,
the executive may never be paid. Protection against employer insolvency
can be obtained by using a secured plan. But tax deferral can then be
accomplished only if the executive restricts himself in a meaningful
fashion; even then, taxation probably cannot be deferred for the full
desired period. As a result, the executive may be taxed on income at a
46. Two Social Security taxes are imposed on employees by the Federal Insurance
Contribution Act. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§3101-3121. Section 3101(a)(5) imposes an annual
Old Age Survivors and Disability tax of 4.95%. Section 3101(b)(3) imposes an annual
Hospital Insurance tax of 0.90%. Thus, the total annual FICA tax imposed on wages is

5.85%.
47. Id. §3121(a).
48. TpxAs. REG. §31.3121(a) - 1(c).
49. Soc. Sec. Rul. 73-30, July, 1973, 2 P-H SOCIAL SEcuRrrY TAXES P39,844.

50. The taxable wage base was increased to $16,500 for 1977.
51. The wage base is adjusted yearly to reflect cost-of-living increases. See 42 U.S.C.
§§403(f)(8), 430 as amended by Pua. L. No. 93-233, §§3(j)-(k), 87 Stat. 952-53 (1973).
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